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Abstract
This paper seeks answers to two questions. First, if a greater social activity of an
individual enhances oblique (i.e. to non-relatives) transmission of her cultural traits,
but reduces their vertical (i.e. to children) transmission as well as family size, which
behavior is optimal from cultural evolution standpoint? I formalize a general model
that characterizes evolutionarily stable behaviors. The proposed model replicates the
theory of Newson et al. (2007) that fertility decline is caused by increasing role of
oblique cultural transmission. Second, if social activity is a rational choice rather than
culturally inherited trait, and if cultural transmission acts on preferences rather than
decisions, which preferences survive the process of cultural evolution? I arrive at a
very simple yet powerful result: under mild assumptions on model structure, only
preferences which emphasize exclusively the concern for social prestige, i.e. extent to
which one’s cultural trait has been picked up by others, survive.
Keywords: Cultural transmission, demographic transition, social prestige, evolutionary
steady state.
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1 Introduction
Culture may flow not only from parents to children, but also between non-relatives – this
phenomenon is known as oblique transmission (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981). Moreover,
the probability that a cultural trait of an individual is picked up by others may depend
on specific characteristics of that individual, a phenomenon called biased transmission by
theorists of cultural transmission (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). Henrich and Gil-White (2001)
define a concept of prestige of an individual, which affects the extent to which others are
willing to pick up her cultural trait. In this paper, I ask a question: if individuals are able
to affect their prestige level via costly effort, namely by reducing family size and vertical
transmission of cultural traits (i.e. transmission from parents to children), what type of
behavior would survive the process of cultural evolution?
In Section 2 of the paper, I specify a very general model that allows to characterize
the evolutionarily stable behaviors, and analyze their dependence on model parameters.
The proposed analysis is done under very loose assumptions about the model ingredients;
in particular, for most of the analysis we do not require differentiability of the maximand
functions, and analyze optimal behavior using derivative-free methods. The proposed model
predicts that an increasing role of oblique transmission causes fertility decline.
The model should be viewed as a mathematical formalization of the idea by Newson et al.
(2007), that fertility decline is caused by changing patterns of social interaction. According
to their theory, fertility is high when individuals are surrounded mainly by close relatives;
in such environments, high fertility cultural traits evolve because low-fertility communities
become physically extinct. Fertility drops as cultural traits increasingly flow between non-
relatives and across communities, because in such environment a low-fertility trait has a
greater chance of survival. Newson (2009) provides empirical evidence in support of the
theory.
In the field of Economics, theorization about cultural transmission usually builds on
“imperfect empathy” preferences introduced by Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2001). There are
several discrete cultural traits; members of each cultural trait derive utility from two ingre-
dients: traditional instantaneous utility dependent on own actions, and instantaneous utility
dependent on actions of children. Instantaneous utility function differs across cultural traits;
parents apply own instantaneous utility to both own actions and those of children. If chil-
dren pick up the “wrong” cultural trait, they act “wrong” from the point of view of parents,
which makes the latter worse off. An expectation of such outcome causes parents to un-
dertake costly “socialization” effort to increase the chance that children pick up parents’
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cultural trait.
Baudin (2010) develops a model of demographic transition that incorporates cultural
transmission and imperfect empathy. There are two cultural types with ad-hoc assumptions
about their fertility preferences and production mode; a productivity shock of one of types
has multiple fertility effects on both types, which are analyzed in the paper.
A disadvantage of the approach to cultural transmission by Bisin and Verdier (2001)
and most subsequent papers is an overly restrictive domain of possible cultural types: ad
hoc assumptions about the utility function are made; the set of possible cultural types is
usually limited to two elements. In Section 3 of this paper, we investigate which preferences
are most successful, i.e. are capable to emulate the most successful behaviors characterized
by Section 2. We arrive at a very simple, nearly tautological, yet powerful idea: on a
very broad domain of possible preferences, the one that prescribes an individual to care
exclusively about the social prestige, i.e. about the extent to which others have learned
from that individual, is no less successful than any other preference map. Under mild
regularity conditions, the preference for social prestige is strictly more successful than any
alternative. An individual who cares not only about social prestige but also about anything
else, e.g. genetic success, private consumption, leisure, absolute wealth, relative wealth, or
any combination of these, makes suboptimal decisions, her cultural trait is picked up less
frequently by the next generation and vanishes over time. A preference for consumption
(and other things) may survive only as long as consumption (or other things) contributes to
the ultimate purpose of social prestige.
2 Family versus social activity: evolution of behavior
In this section, individuals are viewed as dummies which inherit behaviors of the previous
generation. Rational decision making is introduced in Section 3.
2.1 Setup
Consider a dynamic model of overlapping generations set up in discrete time on infinite time
horizon. Each generation lives for two periods, such that generation t lives in period t − 1
when young and period t when old. In each generation, there is a continuum of individuals of
endogenous mass. Each individual i ∈ Gt is characterized by her social activity x(i) ∈ [0, 1]
that is culturally transmitted in a way specified below.
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There is a parent-child relationship in the model: each young individual has one parent
from the previous generation. Young individuals pick up the social activity level from the
previous generation in the following exogenous way. With probability 1 − q, a young indi-
vidual it ∈ Gt picks up the social activity of own parent it−1 ∈ Gt−1. With the remaining
probability q, young individuals pick up the cultural trait of a randomly drawn old individ-
ual, such that the probability measure of drawing an individual jt−1 ∈ Gt−1 is proportional
to the social visibility of the latter, a function of her social activity, f(x(jt−1)). The social
visibility function satisfies the following assumptions:
(i) boundedness: f(0) = 0 and f(1) <∞;
(ii) monotonicity: f(x) < f(x′), ∀x < x′;
(iii) upper semi-continuity: for every α ≥ 0, the set of all x such that f(x) ≥ α is closed.
When it becomes old, he implements the social activity level x(it) that he has picked up
from the previous generation when young. The time spend not on social activity, 1− x(it),
is devoted to family, which results in the family size of n(x(it)) =
1−x(it)
ν
, where ν is the time
cost per child born.
Which behaviors prosper and which perish? Denote by B the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1],
by Pt : B → R+ a probability measure of the number of old individuals at the beginning
of time t on the set of all possible behaviors, such that Pt([0, 1]) = 1, and by Lt ≡ |Gt| a
measure of generation-t population size. Then, the dynamics of Pt(·) is as follows:
Lt+1Pt+1(x) = (1− q)n(x)LtPt(x) + q
f(x)
f¯t
n¯tLtPt(x) (1)
where
f¯t ≡
∫
z∈[0,1]
f(z)dPt([0, z]) (2)
n¯t ≡
∫
z∈[0,1]
n(z)dPt([0, z]) (3)
are average values of the visibility and family size in generation t.
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2.2 Optimal behavior
The standard evolutionary theory prescribes that survival of a behavioral type necessitates
maximization of the rate of growth of the population bearing the respective cultural trait:
max
x
Lt+1Pt+1(x)
LtPt(x)
= (1− q)n(x) + q
f(x)
f¯t
n¯t (4)
First, observe that q = 0 results in maximization of family size only, hence the evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) is x = 0. Also observe that q = 1 results in maximization of prestige
only, hence x = 1 is the ESS. Note however that such strategy implies zero family size and
therefore extinction of the population.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we focus on the interior values of q. Maximization of
(4) with respect to x, given f¯t and n¯t, is equivalent to maximization of
f(x)−
1
ν
1− q
q
f¯t
n¯t
x (5)
with respect to x. Denote by st ≡
1
ν
1−q
q
f¯t
n¯t
≥ 0 the coefficient of the linear part of (5), and
by X(st) the set of all x ∈ [0, 1] that maximize f(x)− stx.
Proposition 1 The set X(s) has the following properties:
(i) existence: X(s) is non-empty for every s;
(ii) boundary closedness: inf(X(s)) ∈ X(s) and sup(X(s)) ∈ X(s);
(iii) ordering: for every pair sL and sH such that sL < sH , for every xL ∈ X(sL), for every
xH ∈ X(sH), we have that xL ≥ xH ;
(iv) completeness: for every x ∈ [0, 1], there exist s such that inf(X(s)) ≤ x ≤ sup(X(s)).
A corollary of the ordering property is that for sH > sL, we have that supX(sH) ≤ infX(sL).
Also note that the completeness property does not state that every x should belong to some
X(s). It only states that there are no “holes” between two consecutive sets, while holes
within a set are possible. The proof of the proposition is in the Appendix.
The set of surviving strategies, X(s) depends on parameter s which in turn itself depends
on the distribution of behaviors. We now turn to characterization of the evolutionary steady
state (ESS henceforth) where the distribution of behaviors does not change over time, and
population grows at a constant rate.
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2.3 Evolutionary steady state
By evolutionary steady state (ESS) we imply a time-invariant distribution of behavioral
types, denoted P∞(·).
1 Time-invariant distribution of types also implies time-invariant av-
erage social activity behavior and average family size, which further implies a constant rate
of population growth. Define by x¯∞ the average social activity in a steady state:
x¯∞ ≡
∫
z∈[0,1]
zdP∞([0, z]) (6)
The following Lemma demonstrates that the set of optimal behaviors of an individual de-
pends only on one moment of the distribution of optimal behaviors of others, namely on the
average x¯∞, which considerably simplifies the analysis of the ESS.
Lemma 1 In evolutionary steady state, the parameter s∞ can be presented as a function of
q and of average social activity x¯∞:
s∞ = s(q, x¯∞) =
1
ν
1− q
q
f(x¯∞)
n(x¯∞)
(7)
Proof. Denote by X ≡ X(s∞) the set of evolutionarily stable behaviors; by definition of
ESS, every surviving individual chooses a strategy from X . If it has only one element x˜,
then the entire mass of the population is concentrated at x˜ and therefore (i) x¯∞ = x˜ and (ii)
s∞ =
1
ν
1−q
q
f(x˜)
n(x˜)
, which proves the claim. If X contains multiple types of behavior, then all of
them must yield the same value of the function f(x)− sx = c, ∀x ∈ X for some c, s. Then,
the function f on the set of surviving strategies should be linear: f = c + sx, ∀x ∈ X , and
can be shown to be equal to
f(x) = f(inf(X)) +
f(sup(X))− f(inf(X))
sup(X)− inf(X)
(x− inf(X)), ∀x ∈ X (8)
Given linearity of f(x) on the domain of evolutionarily stable strategies, its average value f¯∞
is equal to f(x¯∞). Function n(x) is linear by construction on the entire domain of behaviors,
therefore n¯∞ = n(x¯∞). Thus, s∞ is defined by (7).
Given that f(·) is increasing in its argument while n(·) is decreasing in it, it is straight-
forward to observe that s(q, x) is strictly increasing in x, and is strictly decreasing in q.
We now proceed to characterization of the evolutionarily stable average behavior, x¯∞.
Given that individuals are indifferent between elements of X(s(q, x¯∞)) ≡ X , by definition
1Here and thereafter, all variables with an infinity subscript indicate their ESS values.
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of the set, any probability distribution of strategies on that set may be implemented. By
boundary closedness, both infinum and supremum of X(s(q, x¯∞)) belong to the set; the
average strategy may take any value between them. Define by Y (q, x) the set of all possible
values of the average strategy:
Y (q, x) ≡ [infX(s(q, x)), supX(s(q, x))] (9)
Proposition 2 The set-valued function Y (q, x) has the following properties:
(i) existence: Y (q, x) exists for every q ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ [0, 1];
(ii) closedness: Y (q, x) is closed for every q ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ [0, 1];
(iii) q-ordering: for every qL, qH ∈ (0, 1), x ∈ [0, 1] such that qL < qH , we have that
supY (qL, x) ≤ inf Y (qH , x);
(iv) x-ordering: for every q ∈ (0, 1), xL, xH ∈ [0, 1] such that xL < xH , we have that
inf Y (q, xL) ≥ supY (q, xH);
(v) completeness: for any y ∈ [0, 1], and for any q ∈ (0, 1), there exist x such that
inf(Y (q, x)) ≤ y ≤ sup(Y (q, x)).
The proof of the proposition follows directly from the definition of Y (q, x), Lemma 1, and
the properties of X(s). Note that s(q, 1) is formally not defined; we assume Y (q, 1) = {0}.
Intuitively, when average social activity is unity, the average family size is zero, so one’s
cultural trait can be picked up only by own children and therefore zero social activity is
best. The properties of Y (q, x) entail the following
Corollary 1 The graph of Y (q, x) as a function of x is closed, i.e. for any sequence xN
converging to some x ∈ [0, 1] and for any sequence yN converging to some y and such that
yN ∈ Y (q, xN), ∀N , we have that y ∈ Y (q, x).
The proof is contained in the Appendix.
We now study the properties of the steady state average social activity, equal to the fixed
point of Y (q, x) as a function of x, and denoted y(q). Mathematically, x is a fixed point of
Y (q, x) if it satisfies
x ∈ Y (q, x) (10)
Theorem 1 (i) The fixed point of Y (q, x) as a function of x, y(q), exists for any q ∈ (0, 1);
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(ii) y(q) is unique for any q ∈ (0, 1);
(iii) y(q) is weakly increasing in q;
(iv) y(q) ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. excludes boundaries) for any q ∈ (0, 1).
Proof.
(i) Existence is established by the Kakutani fixed point theorem. The theorem requires that
the set Y (q, x) exists and is closed for every q, x, which is established by Proposition
2, and that the graph of Y (q, ·) is closed, which is established by Corollary 1.
(ii) Uniqueness follows from x-ordering of Y : if there were two values xL < xH that satisfied
(10), that would directly contradict the x-ordering requirement that inf Y (q, x¯L) ≥
supY (q, x¯H).
(iii) Take any pair qL < qH . We have that
y(qL) ≤︸︷︷︸
y(qL) is fixed point
sup Y (qL, y(qL)) ≤︸︷︷︸
q-ordering of Y
inf Y (qH , y(qL)) (11)
If both hold with equality, by uniqueness of the fixed point y(qH) we must conclude
that y(qH) = y(qL), and proof is complete. If y(qL) < inf Y (qH , y(qL)), we have that
y(qL) 6= y(qH). Suppose y(qH) < y(qL). Then,
inf Y (qH , y(qH)) ≥︸︷︷︸
x-ordering of Y
supY (qH , y(qL)) ≥ inf Y (qH , y(qL)) > y(qL) > y(qH)
(12)
and therefore y(qH) is not a fixed point. Therefore, y(qH) > y(qL).
(iv) Suppose y(q) = 0. Then s(q, y(q)) = 0, and, by monotonicity of f(·), maximization of
f(x)−s(q, y(q))x with respect to x yields x⋆ = y(q) = 1, which is a contradiction. The
discussion following Proposition 2 establishes that Y (q, 1) = 0, hence unity cannot be
a fixed point either.
Thus, social activity is weakly increasing (and therefore family size is weakly decreasing)
with the rate of oblique transmission, i.e. rate of interaction between non-relatives q. This
is a mathematical formalization of the idea by Newson et al. (2007) that fertility decline is
caused by an increase in such interaction.
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3 Evolutionarily stable preferences
If social activity is a rational choice rather than a result of imitation, and if cultural trans-
mission acts on preferences that govern the choice of social activity, which preferences will
survive in the process of cultural evolution? In this section, we introduce the notion of two
alternative incentives, and let individuals choose an optimal social activity by maximizing a
mix of the two incentives. A cultural trait in this section is the importance of one incentive
over the over; our objective is to characterize the cultural traits that survive.
3.1 The incentives
Throughout the rest of the paper, we fix q ∈ (0, 1), and limit our analysis to the steady state
distribution of behaviors.
Denote by g(x) the social prestige incentive of the decision maker in the steady state, as
a function of social activity x:
g(x) = (1− q)n(x) + q
f(x)
f¯∞
n¯∞ (13)
Note that (13) is mathematically equivalent to the ESS version of (4), and therefore the set of
behaviors that maximize g(x) is X , i.e. the same set that maximizes (4) in the ESS. Denote
by h(x) the alternative incentive, i.e. anything that does not include the social prestige,
such as consumption or family size, as a function of own social activity. To ensure that there
indeed exists a tradeoff between social prestige and the alternative, and that individuals with
different preferences (defined below) indeed make different choices, we impose the following
regularity conditions on h(·) and on the ingredients of g(·):
(i) X belongs to the interior of the behavioral domain: X ⊂ (0, 1);
(ii) The function f(x) is differentiable on X , in addition to properties assumed in section 2.
(iii) The function h(x) is differentiable on X , such that dh(x)
dx
6= 0, ∀x ∈ X .
A direct corollary of (ii) is that dg(x)
dx
exists on X and is equal to zero.
3.2 The utility
We now proceed to the definition of the individual objective function. We assume that
individuals derive utility from social prestige g and from the alternative h; the “importance”
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of each of these alternatives may vary across individuals, and is labeled by a ∈ [0, 1]. We
make the following natural assumptions about the utility function:
(i) more is better: ∂u(g,h,a)
∂g
and ∂u(g,h,a)
∂h
exist, such that ∂u(g,h,a)
∂g
≥ 0, ∂u(g,h,a)
∂h
≥ 0;
(ii) a is the comparative importance of g over h: ∂
2u(g,h,a)
∂g∂a
exists and is strictly positive;
∂2u(g,h,a)
∂h∂a
exists and is strictly negative. Moreover, ∂u(g,h,a)
∂g
= 0 iff a = 0, and ∂u(g,h,a)
∂h
= 0
iff a = 1.
An example of the utility function that satisfies the above assumptions is the constant
elasticity of substitution function:
u(g, h, a) =
(
ag
σ−1
σ + (1− a)h
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
, σ > 0
3.3 Cultural transmission
Unlike in section 2, we assume that cultural transmission acts on the preference parameter
a rather than on choice of social activity x. For this reason, we redefine the distribution of
surviving cultural traits. Denote by Q(·) : B → R+ the probability measure of the steady-
state distribution of a, such that Q([0, 1]) = 1. Denote also by P : B × [0, 1] → R+ the
probability measure of the steady-state distribution of behaviors for every possible cultural
trait, such that P ([0, 1], a) = 1, ∀a. Individual rationality implies that P (x, a) > 0 only if
u(g(·), h(·), a) achieves its maximum at x.
With above notations, the growth rate of a given cultural trait in the steady state is
characterized by the following (cf.(4)):
L′Q′(a)
LQ(a)
= (1− q)
∫
x∈[0,1]
n(x)dP ([0, x], a) + q
∫
x∈[0,1]
f(x)dP ([0, x], a)
f¯∞
n¯∞ (14)
where L′ and Q′ denote future values of the corresponding variables, and where
f¯∞ =
∫
a′∈[0,1]
∫
x∈[0,1]
f(x)dP ([0, x], a′)dQ(a′) (15)
n¯∞ =
∫
a′∈[0,1]
∫
x∈[0,1]
n(x)dP ([0, x], a′)dQ(a′) (16)
We can now formulate the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 The only evolutionarily stable cultural trait is a = 1.
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In other words, only those cultural traits that prescribe their hosts to care exclusively about
social prestige may survive in the process of cultural evolution.
Proof. Standard evolutionary theory necessitates maximization of the rate of growth of
one’s cultural trait which, in turn, requires that every behavior chosen belongs to the set of
evolutionarily stable behaviors: P (x, a) > 0 only if x ∈ X , for every surviving a. Individual
rationality requires that the utility is maximized at every point where P (x, a) > 0. Since,
by assumption, every ingredient of the utility is differentiable on X , we have the following
first-order condition of individual rationality for surviving cultural traits:
du(g(x), h(x), a)
dx
=
∂u(g, h, a)
∂g
dg(x)
dx
+
∂u(g, h, a)
∂h
dh(x)
dx
= 0, ∀x, a : P (x, a) > 0, Q(a) > 0
(17)
From the properties of g(x) and h(x), we have that dg(x)
dx
= 0 and dh(x)
dx
6= 0 for every x that
satisfies (17). The first-order condition is therefore satisfied only if ∂u(g,h,a)
∂h
= 0, which is in
turn only possible if a = 1 due to assumptions imposed on the utility function.
4 Conclusion
Mainstream Economics traditionally assumes that personal consumption is the major goal of
a rational decision maker. Such assumption is at odds with theoretical biology. A carnivore
animal would gladly accept an offer of meat, yet theoretical biologists do not think that
meat consumption is an ultimate purpose of an animal; meat is viewed as an intermediate
good that helps to achieve the ultimate purpose of reproduction. In this paper, I argue that
humans are no different: the apparent desire for private consumption simply masks other,
more fundamental, goals, and consumption per se should enter utility with zero weight.
This idea offers new theoretical insights about the optimal motivation schemes, specifically
motivation of high-ranked employees whose efforts are potentially observable by large number
of people, e.g. those in military, political, religious, or scientific occupations.
This finding is reminiscent of the ideas put forth by the proponents of “memetics,”
in particular Blackmore (2000), that humans may be “infected” by the “memes,” discrete
invisible entities that may alter human behavior. Blackmore (2000) argues that, once the
cost of oblique cultural transmission is low enough, the most successful meme is the one that
induces its host to spread itself as much as possible.
This paper does not assume the presence of the “memes” as discrete entities, yet conveys
a very similar idea. Moreover, we show that the exclusive concern for social prestige emerges
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with any non-zero probability of oblique cultural transmission.
Despite the simplicity of the idea, and its powerful implications for microeconomic theory,
it has been surprisingly overlooked in the field of Economics. This paper is an attempt to
fill the gap.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Since f(x) is upper semi-continuous and is defined on closed support, so is f(x) − sx
with respect to x. A property of such function is that it has a maximum, therefore
X(s) is never empty.
(ii) For arbitrary s, consider any sequence of x ∈ X(s) that converges to inf(X(s)). Upper-
semicontinuity of f(x) − sx with respect to x implies that limx→inf(X(s)) f(x) − sx ≤
f(inf(X(s))) − s inf(X(s)). Since every x ∈ X(s) maximizes f(x) − sx by definition
of X(s), so does inf(X(s)). Therefore, infX(s) ∈ X(s). Likewise, we can prove that
supX(s) ∈ X(s).
(iii) Take arbitrary sL and sH > sL, xL ∈ X(sL), xH ∈ X(sH). By definition of X(·), we
have that
f(xL)− sLxL ≥ f(xH)− sLxH
f(xH)− sHxH ≥ f(xL)− sHxL
By manipulating with these expressions, we can obtain (sH − sL)(xH − xL) ≤ 0.
Therefore, if sH > sL, it must be that xH ≤ xL.
(iv) Suppose the contrary: there is no such s that inf(X(s)) ≤ x ≤ sup(X(s)). Then, pick
the highest possible sL such that x ≤ inf(X(sL)), and lowest possible sH such that
sup(X(sH)) ≤ x. If X(sL) = X(sH), we have that both contain only one element,
namely x, and therefore inf(X(sL)) = x = sup(X(sL)), which proves the claim. If
X(sL) 6= X(sH), we have that sL 6= sH and, by the ordering property, sL < sH . Take
any s ∈ (sL, sH); by the ordering property, sup(X(sH)) ≤ inf(X(s)) and sup(X(s)) ≤
inf(X(sL)). If inf(X(s)) ≤ x ≤ sup(X(s)), proof is complete. If x < inf(X(s)) ≤
inf(X(sL)), that contradicts our assumption that sL was the highest possible with
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x ≤ inf(X(sL)). If sup(X(sH)) ≤ sup(X(s)) < x, that contradicts our assumption
that sH was the lowest possible with sup(X(sH)) ≤ x.
Proof of Corollary 1 Suppose the opposite, i.e. that y 6∈ Y (q, x). Since Y (q, x) is a
closed set, y must be either below its infinum or above its supremum. Suppose, without
loss of generality, y < inf Y (q, x). By completeness and x-ordering of Y , ∃x′ > x such that
y ∈ Y (q, x′). If y < sup Y (q, x′), then every yN < supY (q, x
′) for sufficiently large N , and
therefore by x-ordering we have that xN ≥ x
′ > x for sufficiently large N which contradicts
the assumptions. If y = supY (q, x′), pick any y′′ ∈ (y, inf Y (q, x)); ∃x′′ ∈ (x, x′) such that
y′′ ∈ Y (q, x′′). Then, every yN < y
′′ for sufficiently large N , and therefore by x-ordering we
have that xN ≥ x
′′ > x for sufficiently large N which contradicts the assumptions.
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